

THE LONDON INITIATIVE

SHAPING A BETTER **SHARED FUTURE** FOR
WORLD JEWRY, ALL ISRAELIS AND ISRAEL

Data Pack, October 2025

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Dear TLI Members,

“The London Initiative” (TLI) is guided by a set of non-negotiable moral and strategic propositions relating to strengthening the interlocking “Triangle” of mature liberal democracy, societal fairness and secure peace so critical to Israel’s future. This mission is advanced through unprecedented and bold partnership between likeminded citizens of Israel, world Jewry and international allies. According to our Theory of Change, our members catalyse this process across expanding circles of influence by “doing business differently”.

Leading such effective change must be informed by data that allows for the identification and address of both challenges and opportunities.

Consequently, we are pleased to publish our second 2025 Data Pack prepared by our partners at Molad - the Center for the Renewal of Israeli Democracy, curated by an outstanding team led by Dr. Shai Agmon.

This edition includes 97 studies relating to TLI’s key propositions and identifying opportunities for their advancement. Naturally, much of the data makes for less than happy reading but inevitably the way all data is selected

and interpreted comes down to one of the most basic and unscientific of life choices; whether to see the glass as half empty or half-full.

As the co-founders of TLI we – like all our team and members – choose to see the glass as half full and we believe that the opportunities identified throughout the pack will provide valuable resources and energy for the work ahead.

We encourage you to dive into the pack, to reflect on the findings with fellow members, to share it with your colleagues and stakeholders, to discuss both the findings and analysis with our partners at Molad and above all, to use the pack to derive the knowledge, inspiration, hope and energy required to lead the change-making we all so require.

Sir Mick Davis – Co-Founder TLI

Mike Prashker – Co-Founder and Director TLI

13 Must Know Facts

1. By the end of 2024, Israel's population exceeded 10 million. Israel now surpasses most European countries in size, equalling or exceeding 44 out of 58 nations.
2. By 2065, Israel's population is projected to reach 20 million, with Haredi Jews comprising 33%—double their current share, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) forecasts.
3. Israel has the youngest population among OECD countries when observing those aged under 15, with the highest increase in the youth population aged 0–24 since 2010.
4. Israel lost its long-time status as a liberal democracy in 2023. The leading international democracy watchdog V-Dem downgraded Israel from a liberal to an electoral democracy – for the first time in over 50 years.
5. Participation in elections remains relatively stable, with a turnout of around 70%.
6. Most Israelis believe democracy is in danger. The most recent poll, conducted in 2024, shows the highest concern rate in the past decade.
7. The majority of the Israeli public firmly opposes political violence.
8. Antisemitic incidents in the US, UK, and France have more than doubled since 2022, following years of stagnation or very gradual increases.
9. 30% of children in Israel live below the poverty line.
10. Israel subsidises the religious Jewish education system 16% more than others, including the Arab system, despite recent reductions in the funding gap.
11. The skills of Israeli adults are significantly below the OECD average across all age groups in literacy, numeracy, and adaptive problem-solving.
12. In 2024, Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel were 21 times more likely to be murdered than Jewish citizens. This crisis is growing exponentially. In 2022 it was eleven to one in the Jewish community.
13. A November 2024 survey of Jewish students worldwide by Mosaic United found that 94% feel emotionally attached to Israel.

Molad's Foreword

At the first TLI retreat in February, just eight months ago, Israel stood at a crossroads. On one side, there was a renewed sense of military strength: the army had reasserted its might in Lebanon, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria seemed to herald new possibilities, and talks with Arab states raised hopes that a different regional order was within reach. For a fleeting moment, it seemed as though Israel had regained its strategic confidence. Yet the other path was already visible. The war in Gaza dragged on with no clear horizon, hostages remained in captivity, and the judicial coup advanced relentlessly. The country balanced uneasily between restored strength abroad and deepening political disarray at home.

A year later, the fog has cleared. At Molad we believe that the balance has tipped, and the picture is starker. What began as a just war in response to the massacre of October 7th has been captured and distorted by a government controlled by extremists bent on advancing a messianic vision: conquering Gaza, turning Israel into a Sparta condemned to live forever by the sword, and sacrificing both hostages and soldiers—while inflicting

horrors on Gaza of a breadth we never imagined the Jewish state would ever commit—to satisfy the most radical fringes of the right. This project has come at a profound cost. Israel's international standing has deteriorated, its ties to liberal democracies have frayed, and its relationship with world Jewry has been shaken. Most of all, the country's liberal soul and democratic institutions are under systematic assault by a government that lost the confidence of most Israelis long ago.

The data are unambiguous. Israelis are not satisfied, not hopeful, and do not feel represented by their leaders. They do not identify with this government, yet no competing alternative has fully come into view. This vacuum leaves the liberal camp - the endangered majority - adrift. Still numerically strong and committed to **mature liberal democracy**, but hesitant and disorganised. It risks ceding the field to those who would drag the country into permanent isolation and authoritarianism. The task now is not simply to endure. It is to change the trend altogether, and to offer the public a different future.

That begins with **secure peace**. October 7th destroyed the illusion that the conflict with the Palestinians could be managed indefinitely, kept at the margins while Israel pursued normalisation abroad. The conflict has returned to the centre of Israeli politics, and yet belief in peace has collapsed. Israelis remain open in principle to negotiations, but they no longer believe that peace is achievable. This loss of confidence is not only the product of regional realities; it also reflects the absence of a political vision capable of sustaining hope. Rebuilding that vision will be difficult, but it is essential if peace is to be restored as a credible option.

The same is true in the social and economic sphere. Israel has become a hub of innovation and extraordinary wealth, but inequality has deepened, public services are overstretched, and the education system struggles to prepare the next generation. For many citizens, prosperity feels remote.

This imbalance corrodes trust and leaves society vulnerable to division. Addressing it will require renewed investment in **societal fairness** and inclusion, so that national success is

felt more widely and democracy is strengthened at its base.

Political discourse, too, has narrowed. Even since the February retreat the sanitized idea of “voluntary relocation” from Gaza has been sanitized by no less than President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu. **The Overton Window** has shifted sharply to the right, and ideas once at the centre—peace, equality, human rights—have been pushed to the margins. Yet political debate is never static. With leadership and organisation, space can be reopened, and a broader spectrum of ideas returned to the national conversation. The endangered majority has not disappeared; the question is whether it can regain the confidence to shape the debate rather than simply react to it.

Beyond Israel’s borders, the relationship with world Jewry has reached a critical juncture. The trauma of October 7th inspired remarkable solidarity, but also growing unease, as many in the diaspora feel their values undermined by a government that claims to act in their name. The fate of the Jewish people is tied to Israel’s future, and this moment calls

About the Data Pack

for renewal. While the anti-liberal camp of world Jewry has been highly active in Israeli affairs, the liberal camp has remained comparatively neutral and restrained. That silence is no longer sustainable. It is time for likeminded Israelis and diaspora Jews alike to speak up and speak out. What is needed now is not only solidarity, but true **partnership**—anchored in candour, engagement, and bold moral leadership.

We live in tectonic times. They are unsettling, but they are not fixed. Alongside the dangers lie possibilities for renewal—possibilities we must approach not with fear, but with confidence. The data collected here should not confine our imagination; it should ground it. These numbers and trends give us a clearer view of reality, but they do not determine where we go from here. Our responsibility, as leaders and activists, is to face the facts honestly while refusing to confuse realism with resignation. Realism is the floor on which imagination and determination must stand. The question before us is not whether Israel has a future, but what kind of future we are prepared to build.

This data pack is designed to support discussions, exchanges, and decision-making among TLI Network members and likeminded allies and stakeholders. It offers a factual benchmark and identifies opportunities for more effective action at the individual, organisational, network, and strategic levels. While not exhaustive, it provides a comprehensive overview of the main trends in Israeli society over the past two decades.

The document aims to inspire informed dialogue and strategic action by Network members and will continue to be updated twice a year in the lead-up to retreats. It will be shared with all Network members, and suggestions for the inclusion of additional data in future editions are warmly welcomed.

The data is drawn from reliable sources, with significant contributions from TLI members, to whom we extend our sincere gratitude for their cooperation and insights.

Please note that the abbreviation **T** denotes Takeaway, while **FE** stands for Further Explanation.

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Data from the Israel Democracy Institute data project is courtesy of the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute.


Data from the Israel National Elections Survey is available at the project website - <https://www.tau.ac.il/~ines/>

Data on New Israel Fund grants for 2024 is courtesy of the New Israel Fund.

Section 1: Introduction: Demographic Data on Israel, Palestine and World Jewry

This section provides an overview of the demographic and social dynamics shaping Israel, Palestine, and World Jewry. It highlights trends in population growth, religious and cultural composition, and long-term projections, offering a detailed picture of the structure of Israeli society. These insights lay a critical foundation for understanding the broader political, social, and economic challenges addressed in the sections that follow.


Figure 1.1 - Israel Population, 1948-2024



CBS, 2023

- FE1:** In 2023, Israel’s population reached 10 million. Israel now surpasses most European countries in size, equalling or exceeding 44 out of 58 nations.
- FE2:** Israel’s Arab population is composed of 85.5% Sunni Muslims, 7.4% Druze, and 6.9% Christians and constitutes 21.3% of Israel’s citizens.
- T:** Israel’s demographic growth challenges its self-perception as a “small state”.

Figure 1.2 - Core Jewish Population (Conservative Estimation) –
Top Countries 2021-2023



Sergio DellaPergola, 2021;2023


Figure 1.3 - Israelis Abroad - Israeli Born Jewish in the Diaspora (Incl. dual
Citizenships) 2025



FE: There are an estimated 15.8 million Jews worldwide, with 7.3 million living in Israel and 8.5 million in the diaspora, including 6.3 million in the United States.

These figures reflect a conservative count, based on the traditional religious definition of Jewish identity through maternal lineage. According to a 2020 Pew Research survey, 37% of American Jews identify as Reform, 17% as Conservative, and 9% as Orthodox, while the remainder do not affiliate with specific branches. The Jewish Agency further estimates that an additional 10 million people in the diaspora, though not included in this conservative reading, are eligible for Aliyah under Israel's Law of Return.

Figure 1.4 - Israel's Population Forecast, 2015–2065



CBS, 2022

FE: By 2065, Israel's population is projected to reach 20 million, with Haredi Jews comprising 33% – double their current share, according to CBS forecasts.

Figure 1.5 - Jewish Settlements in the West Bank






Figure 1.6 - Jewish Population in the West Bank, 1967-2024



CBS, 2023

FE: The Jewish population in the West Bank has grown to nearly 512,000 (excluding the Jewish population in east Jerusalem). According to 2025 Peace Now data, this includes 141 official settlements, five cities, and over 250 outposts.

Figure 1.7 - Illegal New Outposts by Year – 1991-2025




UN, 2024

FE: Since the current government came to power, the number of legalised outposts has risen, presented as an effort to incentivise Jewish settlement in the West Bank and expand control over Palestinian land.

T: As Dror Etkes's findings indicate, the new wave of legal outposts reflects a strategic shift: settlement expansion is now less about demographic growth and more about land appropriation and territorial control, focused primarily on capturing agricultural land rather than constructing new housing or towns.

Figure 1.8 - Palestinian Population, West Bank + Gaza Strip, 1955-2024




UN, 2024

FE: At the start of 2024, there were 3.26 million Palestinians in the West Bank and 2.22 million in Gaza, according to United Nations data.

T: Over 15 million people live between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, roughly half of them Jewish.

Figure 1.9 - Long-Term Leaving and Returning Trends in Israel, 2010-2023




CBS, 2024

Figure 1.10 - Long-Term Leaving and Returning - Jan-Sep, 2009-2023

Number of native-born Israeli emigrants and returnees*

during January-September in each year, 2009-2023

Each year represents the number of those who left that year and were still abroad in the following year, and those who returned that year and were still in Israel in the following year. These are native-born Israelis who remained abroad, or in Israel, a minimum of 275 out of the 365 days since their departure (with first 90 days continuously).




Source: Dan Ben-David, Shores Institute and Tel Aviv University Data: Eilat Cohen-Kastro, Marina Sheps, Alaa Atrash and Ahmad Hleihel from the Central Bureau of Statistics

Dan Ben-David, Shores Institute 2024

FE: In recent years - and more prominently since October 7th - long-term emigration among Israelis has steadily increased. This group is defined as those spending fewer than 90 days in Israel over the previous 12 months. Each year shown represents the number of native-born Israelis who left in that year and remained abroad in subsequent years, as well as those who returned in that year and continued living in Israel thereafter.

T: The trend spiked in 2023, coinciding with the Judicial Coup, with a 43% rise in departures. Credible data for 2024 is not yet available.

Figure 1.11 - Extent of Religiosity, Jews in Israel, 2002-2024




CBS Social Survey, 2022

FE1: Among Israel's Jewish population, the largest group self-identifies as 'secular'. When combined with traditional Jews who consider themselves 'not so religious', a significant majority of Israeli society is non-religious.

FE2: A 2017 poll by the Reform Movement in Israel found that 7% of Jewish Israelis identify as Reform and 4% as Conservative.

T: The share of Israelis identifying as traditional is shrinking, while the secular community continues to grow. This challenges the common perception that secular Israelis are gradually becoming more religious or traditional. A more plausible explanation for the heightened visibility of religious symbols and language in public life is the rise of Israeli nationalism, which increasingly borrows and repurposes religious imagery. These symbols often function less as expressions of personal faith and more as elements of nationalistic display, reflecting cultural kitsch rather than a genuine rise in religiosity.


Figure 1.12 - Joining and Leaving the Haredi Community
(% by Year of Birth), 1953-2000



Regev & Gordon, 2021


T: Economic incentives, education, integration policies, and cultural shifts have historically shaped the social and political orientation of groups in Israel. As this graph shows, religiosity trends are already shifting, suggesting that future trajectories of group size and affiliation may be more fluid than commonly assumed. A slight trend of leaving the Haredi community should not be read as evidence of imminent integration - rapidly growing groups will naturally see more individuals moving out. What it does indicate, however, is that the broader integration of Haredi communities into Israeli society is not predetermined, but remains open to change, particularly in the areas of education, employment, and civic participation.

Figure 1.13 - Share of Under-15 Population – OECD Countries, 2022



OECD, 2023

Figure 1.14 - 0-24 Population Growth of Ages 0-24 – OECD Countries, 2010-2022




OECD, 2023

FE: Israel has the youngest population among OECD countries when observing those aged under 15, with the highest increase in the youth population aged 0-24 since 2010.

T: Being the youngest country in the industrialised world presents both opportunities and challenges. A young population offers significant productivity potential but also increases population density and places immense pressure on public systems and infrastructure—particularly given Israel’s rapid growth from 3.8 million in the 1980s to 10 million today. Moreover, the majority of Jewish newborns are from the Ultra-Orthodox community, which currently contributes less to economic productivity and is educated within an anti-liberal system.

Figure 1.15 - Fertility Rate by Religious and Ethnic Group, 1990-2022




CBS, 2023

FE: Fertility rates among different communities in Israel have shifted in recent years, with notable declines observed in the Haredi community and a sharp drop in the Arab community.

T: The 2003 child support reform, which significantly reduced social benefits, played a key role in reshaping fertility patterns across Israel. Similarly, preliminary data for 2023–2024, analysed by Taub Institution, indicate that Jewish women experienced a dramatic increase of around 10% compared to 2020–2022—a development that researchers attribute to the impact of the war. These fluctuations highlight the sensitivity of fertility patterns to wider social and political events, and suggest that long-term demographic trends are more fluid than often assumed. Fertility rates are shaped by policy decisions and external shocks, rather than being determined solely by “natural” factors.


Figure 1.16 - 1st Grade Pupils in Israel Across Different Education Systems, 2008-2025



Knesset Data Center, 2023

FE: The share of Orthodox students among first-grade students is steadily increasing.

Figure 1.17 - Pupils Forecast by Education System, 2025-2050



CBS, 2023

FE: According to the CBS forecast for 2050, 35% of Israeli pupils are projected to be enrolled in the Haredi education system


Section 2: The Triangle

This section unpacks the TLI framework's three interconnected pillars: mature liberal democracy, secure peace, and societal fairness. It begins with data-driven insights into Israel's democratic health, examining indicators such as voter turnout, press freedom, and public trust in institutions. It then turns to public opinion on peace and security, including attitudes towards war and generational shifts in support for a Palestinian state. Finally, it assesses Israel's standing as a modern welfare state, focusing on poverty, food insecurity, social mobility, gender gaps, and homicide rates.

2a Mature Liberal Democracy

This subsection presents data on the state of Israel's democratic health as it approaches its 80th year, highlighting both vulnerabilities and enduring strengths. The data reveals a democracy under strain: most Israelis see democracy as being in peril, trust in the media is low, and fears about lifestyle changes across different communities run deep. Yet, amidst these concerns, there are reasons for cautious optimism. Violence as a means of change is largely rejected, voter turnout remains high, and Israeli youth continue to champion core democratic values like minority rights. While the challenges are urgent and significant, the resilience of key democratic norms and institutions offers a foundation for renewal and progress.


Figure 2.a.1 - Israel V-Dem Score, 1959-2024



V-Dem, 2024

FE: Israel’s democracy classification by the V-Dem Institute has been downgraded to an “electoral democracy”. The country’s Liberal Democracy score declined in 2023, reflecting the government’s attempts at judicial overhaul. In 2024, Israel’s score fell further to 6.17, down from 6.3 the previous year. Considering recent developments, including efforts to curtail the independence of the Attorney General, it is plausible that Israel’s 2025 score will decline again, potentially dropping below the threshold of electoral democracy. V-Dem is widely regarded as one of the world’s most authoritative indices measuring the quality of democracy.

Figure 2.a.2 - Changes in Views of Democracy Between 2012 and 2022 by Country




Hernández, 2025

FE: Over the past decade, Israelis have attached steadily less importance to core democratic principles such as the rule of law, the protection of minority rights, and even the holding of free and fair elections. These findings are drawn from a comparative study by Mónica Ferrín and Hanspeter Kriesi, which examined public perceptions of democracy across countries between 2012 and 2022.

T: Compared with all other countries in the study, Israel registered the steepest decline in the importance attributed to free and fair elections.

Figure 2.a.3 - Voter Turnout vs. Public Trust in Democracy, 2003–2022




IDI & Election Board, 2003-2022

FE: Participation in elections remains relatively stable, with a turnout of around 70%. This is despite the ongoing decline in public trust in democracy, which has reached an all-time low.

T: General ‘Get Out the Vote’ campaigns might not significantly boost turnout in a society with consistently high and stable participation, though they can help sustain current levels.

Figure 2.a.4 - Arab Community Turnout vs. Overall Turnout, 1999–2022




Roditski, 2023

FE: There is a significant gap in voter turnout between the overall population and the Arab community, though this trend is unstable and fluctuates between elections.

T: This fluctuation suggests that Arab voter participation is closely tied to the political opportunities available in a given election. When Arab citizens believe their vote can influence outcomes, turnout rises significantly. This indicates that participation depends less on get-out-the-vote campaigns alone and more on fostering genuine political inclusion and cooperation between Arab parties and liberal Zionist parties.

Figure 2.a.5 - Israeli Arab Voting Distribution: Arab vs. Jewish Parties, 1999-2022




Roditski, 2023

FE: A stable trend visible in Arab voters' behaviour is the steady decrease in voting for Jewish parties, from 31.4% in 1999 to just 14.2% in 2022.

T: This can lead to one of two conclusions. One is that Arab society in Israel is more cohesive than it used to be, and the divide between the Arab and Jewish communities has sharpened. If this is the case, the future of Arab-Jewish relations will be shaped between parties, not within them. The other is that Jewish parties have failed in recent decades to open their ranks to the Arab community, and offer them effective concern and representation, which still leaves room for hope and change within parties as well.


Figure 2.a.6 - Is Israeli Democracy in Danger? Agree/Disagree, 2017-2024



IDI Democracy Index, 2024

FE: Most Israelis believe democracy is in danger. The most recent poll, conducted in 2024, shows the highest rate of concern in the past decade.

Figure 2.a.7 - Fear about Israel’s Democracy Across Political Affiliations, 2017-2024




IDI Democracy Index, 2024

FE: Concerns about the state of democracy vary widely across Israel’s political spectrum. Among Jewish voters, 94% of left-wing voters, 71% of centrists, and 38% of right-wing voters feel democracy is in danger.

T: As other studies suggest, the reasons behind these fears differ: the left is alarmed by the judicial overhaul and the ongoing occupation, while the right fears the influence of an unelected ‘deep state’. Understanding these distinctions is crucial for addressing the challenges facing Israeli democracy.

Figure 2.a.8 - Public Trust in the Police - 2023-2025




Institute for Liberty and Responsibility, 2025

FE: Up to October 7th, public trust in the police was low, polarised, and highly politicised - largely due to the takeover of the police by Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir. A brief surge in trust followed the October 7th attacks, reflecting a moment of national unity and a classic “rally around the flag” effect. During this period, the gap between coalition and opposition voters narrowed noticeably. However, the effect was short-lived: trust soon declined again, with polarisation re-emerging and distrust in the police once more on the rise, particularly among opposition voters.

T: The rapid decline in trust after the brief rise following the October 7th massacre shows that empty calls for unity are insufficient. Polarisation does not arise from a lack of solidarity or mutual hostility among Israelis, but from the corruption and misuse of institutions by the current government.


Figure 2.a.9 - Optimistic and Pessimistic Feelings About the Future of Israel’s Political System, 2024



Pew, 2024

FE: This trend of increased fear for democracy is also reflected in the proportion of the public who feel pessimistic about the future of the country’s political system. This sentiment is more prominent among those in the political centre and left.


Figure 2.a.10 - Support for a Strong Leader, 2014–2022



IDI, 2014-2022

FE: Israelis are increasingly willing to support a strong leader who would disregard the parliament, media, and public opinion. However, despite the overall increase in recent years, there is a noticeable decline in the most recent poll, and the trend remains fluctuating and inconsistent.

Figure 2.a.11 - Majority Opposes Political Violence, 2003-2023




IDI, 2003-2023

FE: While there is an apparent willingness to support a strong leader, the majority of the public firmly opposes political violence.

T: This reflects a vital characteristic of a democratic society: the shared understanding that violence is not a legitimate means to achieve political goals. Disagreement with this principle rose after the Gaza disengagement plan in 2005, suggesting that support for political violence became more prevalent among segments of the right. However, since this question was not fielded in 2024–2025, more recent attitudes in the context of the judicial coup cannot be assessed.

Figure 2.a.12 - Should Jewish Halacha Rule the Public Sphere? 2003-2022




INES

FE: Opposition to Jewish Halacha rule has increased over time. In 2003, 50% opposed the idea, rising to 60% in 2023 (with 64% opposing it in 2022).

T: While parts of Israeli society are becoming more anti-liberal and anti-democratic, other areas, such as tolerance for the LGBTQ community and opposition to Halacha rule, show a growing liberal trend.

Figure 2.a.13 - Concerns About the Ability to Maintain a Desired Lifestyle by Political Camps (Jewish Population), 2017–2024




IDI Democracy Index, 2024

FE: Among secular Jews, 77.5% express fear for their ability to maintain their lifestyle.

T: A common trope in Israeli politics is that centre-left voters are wealthy, content with the status quo, and unaffected by broader issues like the occupation or societal fairness, making them unlikely to mobilise for change. However, the increasing share of centre-aligned individuals expressing fear highlights an opportunity for renewed mobilisation.


Figure 2.a.14 - Youth Position on Equal Rights for Minorities, 2020-2024



aChord, 2024

FE: A majority of Israeli youth support equal rights for minorities, with Arab youth showing even higher levels of agreement.

Figure 2.a.15 - Freedom of the Press Index 2013-2025




RSF

FE: In recent years, press freedom in Israel has come under increasing pressure from government-led initiatives that undermine media independence. According to the latest Freedom of the Press Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Israel ranks 112th out of 180 countries, a drop of 11 places in just one year. Alongside

V-Dem, RSF remains one of the most widely recognised global measures of media freedom and democratic health.

T: The anti-liberal media environment in Israel extends far beyond Channel 14 and Israel Today, encompassing broader attacks on press freedom and independent journalism. Current efforts to dismantle the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation (IPBC), including a controversial bill mandating its privatization or closure within two years, highlight a significant threat to democracy. The destruction of a national broadcaster that serves diverse communities undermines public trust and erodes social cohesion. Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi’s pushes to sideline the IPBC, along with moves to centralize control over media ratings and government boycotts of critical outlets like Haaretz, underscores the multifaceted nature of these attacks on the free press.

Figure 2.a.16 - Polarisation in Media Criticism, 2022



FE: A study by Dr. Ayala Panievsky revealed significant differences in how media criticism is expressed across Israel’s political camps, which she categorises as “pro-Bibi” and “anti-Bibi” (terms intended to capture attitudes toward governments led by Netanyahu). The “pro-Bibi” camp tends to view the media


as a unified body with hostile intent, directing criticism at it in a personal and delegitimising manner rather than focusing on professional standards.

T: In an environment where the media is viewed as untrustworthy and politically motivated, elite capture by anti-liberal leadership becomes easier. It is far more difficult to hold politicians accountable when critical journalists are disregarded. This mistrust stems from multiple factors, including the failings of Israel's mainstream media, but it is also the result of a deliberate and sustained campaign by the anti-liberal right.

2b Secure Peace

This subsection delves into public opinion in Israel regarding security and peace. In the aftermath of an unprecedented and brutal war—the worst security failure and massacre in Israel's history—it is no surprise that attitudes toward peace and coexistence have reached a low point. Yet, a year later, a majority of Israelis recognise that true security cannot depend solely on military force; peace talks are essential. The challenge lies in bridging a deep and enduring confidence gap. While many Israelis support negotiations and the vision of peace, growing pessimism about its feasibility continues to overshadow these aspirations. The persistent “no-partner” narrative further limits political imagination, leaving the path to peace mired in doubt.

Figure 2.b.1 - What Will Ensure Israel’s Security the Most in the Short Term, 2024




IDI, 2024

FE: As the war progresses, more Israelis support pursuing regional agreements, while fewer back military actions as the primary means to secure Israel’s short-term security.

T: Despite experiencing one of its most violent periods and an ongoing government narrative promoting total victory through force, most Israelis still recognise that peace is essential for achieving security. This deep connection between peace and security offers a reason for optimism, challenging the stereotype that peace is merely a pursuit for idealistic left-wingers.


Figure 2.b.2 - Regional War vs. Israeli-Palestinian Peace, 2024



Yakter, 2024

FE: Even after the October 7th war, a July 2024 survey by Dr. Alon Yakter shows 55% of Israeli Jews and 88% of Israeli Arabs prefer peace between Israel and Palestine over regional war.


Figure 2.b.3 - The Peace ‘Confidence Gap’, 2002-2020



Yakter & Harsgor, 2022

FE: Over the past two decades, a persistent gap has emerged between Israelis’ support for peace negotiations and their belief that peace will actually be achieved—a phenomenon often described as the “confidence gap.” While a majority continues to support negotiations in principle, there is a growing sense of pessimism about the prospects for a durable resolution. As the data in this subsection illustrates, the gap has persisted after October 7th and even widened, as both support for negotiations and optimism about peace have trended downward, reflecting an erosion of confidence alongside declining enthusiasm for talks.

Figure 2.b.4 - Support for a Two-State Agreement and Perceptions of Arab States’ Role, 2023–2025




Politography. Arieli 2025

FE: In addition to the long-standing “confidence gap” between the desire for peace and the belief in its achievability, a new gap has emerged in recent years, particularly following the signing of the Abraham Accords. This gap is between support for regional involvement by other Arab countries in agreements to stabilise the Middle East, and support for a two-state solution. While support for the two-state solution has steadily declined and now registers at relatively low levels, the idea of a broader regional agreement involving Arab partners has gained significantly more traction among Israelis.

T: This data indicates that the strategy pursued by right-wing governments since 2009, to build peace in the Middle East without the Palestinians, has become firmly embedded in Israeli politics. The core idea has been that Israel can normalise relations with its neighbours without resolving the Palestinian conflict or halting settlement expansion. After the October 7th massacre, however, Arab leaders consistently reaffirmed that no further normalisation will occur without meaningful progress towards peace with the Palestinians. Yet, perhaps reflecting the declining popularity of the two-state solution, leaders from across the political spectrum continue to speak vaguely about a “regional order,” without committing to a concrete resolution of the conflict—sustaining the illusion that peace without Palestinians is achievable.


Figure 2.b.5 - Belief in Co-Existence in Jewish and Arab Populations, 2013-2025



Pew, 2024


FE: The 2024 poll reveals a stark contrast in views on peaceful coexistence: only 1 in 5 Israeli Jews believe it is possible, compared to 1 in 2 Israeli Arabs.

Figure 2.b.6 - Net Support (%) for two state solution 1994-2025



Politography, Arieli 2025

Figure 2.b.7 - Perceived Feasibility of a Two-State Solution Among Israeli Adults, 2013–2025




Pew, 2025

FE: Support for a two-state solution among Israeli Jews is at an all-time low. The decline began after Netanyahu’s return to power in 2009 and has deepened steadily over the years—reaching its lowest point in the aftermath of October 7th.

T: The sharp shift in public opinion within just a decade is deeply concerning, but it also shows that attitudes towards the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are not fixed or rooted in fanaticism. Rather, they respond to events on the ground and signals from political leadership. If public opinion can change so dramatically in one direction, it can also change back. Views on this issue are not solid, but contingent and open to influence.

Figure 2.b.8 - Beliefs on Settlements Contribution to Security, 2025




Pew, 2025

FE: A majority of Israeli Jewish adults believe that settlements contribute to Israel’s security—an assessment that stands in stark contrast to the views of the overwhelming majority of Israel’s former heads of the security establishment, who have consistently argued the opposite.

T: Support for the settlement project in Israel remains overwhelmingly grounded in security concerns. This reflects two important dynamics. First, the settlement movement has failed to persuade most Israelis of its core ideological claim—that expansion should be pursued for religious or messianic reasons tied to the sanctity of the land. Second, the movement has been highly effective in framing settlements as essential to Israel’s security. Yet this also leaves room for optimism: security arguments can be challenged and reshaped, meaning public opinion is not fixed. For most Israelis, views on settlements are not fanatical, but contingent on how the security debate is framed.

Figure 2.b.9 - Generational Support for a Palestinian State, 1981–2019




Harsegor, 2024

FE: Younger generations in Israel are less supportive of the creation of a Palestinian state. This ‘hawkish’ generation, born between 1995 and 2005, shows a marked shift in attitudes compared to older generations. Dr. Liran Harsegor’s study indicates that while younger generations have historically been less supportive of a Palestinian state, they tend to become more supportive as they age. The sharp rise in support for a Palestinian state, reflected in the chart, was politically evident in Rabin’s election as Prime Minister in 1992 and the subsequent Oslo Accords.

T: Generational attitudes are shaped by leadership and external events and can shift rapidly. While Israel’s younger generation is currently more right-wing—an anomaly compared to other countries—this could change, offering significant opportunities for the future.

Figure 2.b.10 - Changing Beliefs Towards Peace with Egypt, 1973-1978




IDI, 1973-1978

FE: Immediately after the Yom Kippur War, most Israelis doubted Egypt’s interest in peace with Israel. However, three years later, over half of the public believed otherwise, and by November 1977, following Sadat’s visit to Israel, the vast majority were convinced of Egypt’s intentions. A peace treaty was signed in March 1979.

T: A historical perspective demonstrates how public opinion can shift significantly within a short period.


Figure 2.b.11 - High School Students’ Opinions About the ‘Other’ Group (Jewish and Arab), 2024



Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2023

FE: Jewish pupils show heightened levels of hate and fear toward Arabs, but also a shared willingness to learn about the conflict, suggesting potential for greater tolerance and shifts in attitudes.

Figure 2.b.12 - University Students’ Views on the ‘Other’ Group in Israel, 2024



aChord, 2024


FE: University students exhibit lower levels of hate toward the 'other' group, aligning with the ‘hawkish generations’ trend, which suggests that older generations tend to become more tolerant over time.

2c Societal Fairness

This subsection presents data on the distribution of resources and opportunities in Israeli society, focusing on indicators of cohesion and fairness such as social mobility, cost of living, poverty rates, gender gaps, education, and violence in minority communities. The graphs show how, despite Israel’s wealth and innovation, deep inequalities persist: poverty and food insecurity remain among the highest in the OECD, families face rising costs, and education standards are slipping. These pressures are compounded by sluggish growth, declining

investment, and political instability linked to the judicial overhaul and regional conflict. We chose not to focus on short-term economic effects of the war, which are difficult to interpret. For now, the shekel remains strong, the stock market has stabilised, and some sectors—including defence and parts of high-tech, particularly cyber—have even benefited. Yet these signs of resilience mask troubling long-term trends: declining investment in civilian sectors, reputational “grey boycotts” and disinvestment, and the diversion of younger generations from education and production into prolonged military service. Taken together, the data suggest that while Israel’s economy shows areas of strength, its post-war outlook is fragile, with much depending on how—and under what circumstances—the war ultimately ends.


Figure 2.c.1 - Income Inequality, OECD Countries 2022



OECD, 2022

FE: Although the Gini coefficient is a debated, and imperfect measure of inequality, it remains a widely recognised indicator. For years, Israel has been one of the most unequal societies in the OECD. However, due to measures like the 2018 minimum wage increase, Israel’s Gini coefficient has improved. In 2011, Israel ranked as the 4th most unequal economy, but by 2022, it had improved to the 8th position.

Figure 2.c.2 - Social Expenditures in Israel, 2000-2024




OECD, 2023

FE: Government expenditure on social welfare (net) has been dramatically reduced over the past twenty years.

T: While the fiscal burden of war will make new investments difficult, the scale of past neglect leaves substantial room for improvement. Strengthening welfare provision remains a critical opportunity to improve the lives of Israelis and rebuild social resilience.


Figure 2.c.3 - Percentage Below Poverty Rate – OECD Countries, 2021



OECD, 2023

FE: One in six people in Israel lives in poverty, with the poverty rate being one of the highest among OECD countries. Data by age group reveals that nearly 30% of children are below the poverty line. This is especially concerning given that Israel is the youngest nation in the developed world.

Figure 2.c.4 - Percentage Below Poverty Threshold by Age Group, 2010-2023




BTL, 2024

FE: In Israel, 27.9% of children, 20.7% of adults, and 14.8% of older citizens live in poverty.

T: Addressing poverty, particularly among children, is a key challenge for Israel’s future. The high rate of child poverty not only affects the present but also has long-term implications for the country’s socio-economic development. The younger generation’s growing political influence will be shaped by their experiences with inequality and poverty. In addition, the attached graph, which shows poverty rates across different groups, reflects broader economic inequality. As Mike Prashker emphasizes in A Place for Us All – Social Cohesion and The Future of Israel, economic disparities are strongly linked to weak social cohesion. These inequalities, particularly among vulnerable groups, undermine trust in institutions and hinder the development of a more unified society.

Figure 2.c.5 - Percentage Below Poverty Rate by Communities, 2022-2023




BTL, 2024

FE: The Arab and Haredi communities are the poorest in Israel.

T: Tackling poverty in these groups requires tailored approaches and addresses different challenges. The Haredi community, with significant political power, faces poverty partly due to politically motivated policies. In contrast, the Arab community, historically lacking political power and facing systemic repression, presents a more complex picture.


Figure 2.c.6 - Moderate and Severe Food Insecurity, 2021-2023



Taub, 2025

FE: The high price levels relative to GDP per capita in Israel contribute to the significant proportion of the population experiencing food insecurity, with Israel ranking second highest among OECD welfare states.


Figure 2.c.7 - Price Level Relative to GDP Per Capita – OECD Countries, 2022



Taub, 2024

FE: Israel is among the most expensive countries to live in within the OECD, with rising costs of living exacerbating poverty, particularly for families with children.

Figure 2.c.8 - GDP's Deviation from the Pre-war Trend and Accounting Contribution of Its




BOI, 2025

FE: Israel faces mounting economic risks in the post-war period, including investor withdrawal and the cost of sustaining hundreds of thousands of people in reserve duty.

T: Despite an apparent rise in public consumption, much of it is government-fuelled. Market indicators suggest Israel is heading into a period of economic instability, underscoring the urgency of preparing for a potential crisis.


Figure 2.c.9 - Israel's Credit Rating History by Agency – 1988-2024



Rating Agencies

FE: The risks to Israel's economy have been reflected in its credit rating, which hit its lowest level in 2024 after being downgraded twice by all major rating agencies.


Figure 2.c.10 - High-Tech Investments in Israel, 2015-2025 Q1



Taub, 2025


FE: High-tech investments in Israel have declined sharply, falling from record highs in 2021 to levels last seen a decade ago. This trend mirrors global patterns and, according to the Taub Center, has not been significantly affected by either the war or the judicial coup.

Figure 2.c.11 - The Family Index - How Easy Is It to Raise a Family? 2024



FE: A recently developed index by the Berl Katznelson Foundation allows for a comparative analysis of Israel’s family-friendly government policies. The index examines factors such as paid parental leave, early childhood education, and healthcare services. The data reveals that Israel ranks far behind most countries, positioned alongside the United States, where such support systems are minimal. A higher score on the index indicates a more equitable and supportive governmental framework for raising a family.


Figure 2.c.12 - Gender Wage Gap in OECD Countries (Percentage of Median Earnings of Men), 2022



OECD, 2022

FE: Israel has a significant gender wage gap of nearly 21%, ranking as the fourth highest among OECD countries.

Figure 2.c.13 - Social Mobility in Israel: Probability of a Child Reaching the Top 25% if Parents Are in the Bottom 25%, by Ethnicity, Community, and Religion, 2022




Gordon & Flug & Kenneth Portal, 2022

FE: Social mobility in Israel is highest among Ashkenazi Jews, with 24% of children from the bottom 25% reaching the top 25%. Former USSR Jews and Mizrahi Jews follow at 17%, while Haredi Jews and Arabs rank significantly lower.

T: This data highlights the relatively successful integration of the FSU Jewish community, which, as a newer migrant community, has rapidly closed the gap with Mizrahi Jews. However, it also underscores the enduring ethnic-based structural inequalities in opportunities within Israel.

Figure 2.c.14 - Annual Expenditure per Pupil (1st to 12th Grade) in Israel - Jewish and Arab Education Systems, 2014-2023




Ministry of Education Finance System, 2024

FE: Israel subsidises the religious Jewish education system more than other education systems, despite recent reductions in the funding gap. The gap remains about 16% in favour of the religious education system, with this preferential funding also evident when compared to the Arab education system.


T: Initiatives promoting liberal and democratic education are essential but insufficient to counteract the significant discriminatory investment in anti-liberal education within independent streams in Israel. Meaningful change requires efforts at the government or national campaign level and, in the long term, structural reforms—such as dissolving the four separate school streams or at least softening divisions through shared training, study, and teaching opportunities.

Figure 2.c.15 - TIMSS Educational Test Score in Israel – 8th Grade, by Education System, 2019-2023



Ministry of Education, 2024


Figure 2.c.16 - PISA Educational Test Score in Israel – 9th Grade, by Primary Language, 2022



OECD, 2023

FE: Israeli students’ performance in international education assessments is on a steady decline, with scores falling below the OECD average across both religious and Arab communities.


Figure 2.c.17 - Within-Countries Gaps in PISA Educational Test Score – 9th Grade Pupils, OECD Countries, 2022



OECD, 2023

FE: Israel has the highest level of disparities in student achievement among OECD countries, underscoring significant inequities within its education system.

Figure 2.c.18 - High-School Diploma Eligibility Rates Among 12th Graders by Communities, 2019-2022




Ministry of Education, 2023

FE: Diploma eligibility rates remain very high and stable among Druze and non-Haredi Jews, while rates in Arab and Bedouin communities are increasing but still significantly lag behind. The Haredi community remains almost entirely outside the system, with a diploma eligibility rate of less than 30%.

T: While performance in international tests declines, stagnant or rising diploma eligibility rates in some communities may indicate a decrease in the overall quality of education in Israel.


Figure 2.c.19 - Israel’s Adults’ Skills in Comparison to OECD Average, 2024



OECD, 2024

FE: The skills of Israeli adults are significantly below the OECD average across all age groups in literacy, numeracy, and adaptive problem-solving.


Figure 2.c.20 - Life Expectancy in Israel 2012-2022



Ministry of Health, 2023

FE: Arab male life expectancy in Israel is five years lower than that of Jewish males, while Arab female life expectancy is three years lower than that of Jewish females. These figures highlight significant inequalities between communities despite Israel’s overall high life expectancy.

Figure 2.c.21 - Homicide Rates Per 100,000: Comparison Between Jewish and Arab Communities in Israel, 2000-2025*



Knesset Data Center, 2023 (for 2000-2022)
Avraham Initiative, 2025 (for 2023-2024)
Kan Brodecast, 2025 (for 2025)


FE: In 2022, a person from the Arab community in Israel was 11 times more likely to be murdered than a person from the Jewish community. In 2024, a person from the Arab community in Israel was 21 times more likely to be murdered than a person from the Jewish community.

Section 3: Political Trends and The Overton Window

This subsection presents data on the shifting Overton Window in Israel—the spectrum of political ideas and policies considered acceptable in public discourse. Measuring these shifts is not straightforward, as the boundaries of what can and cannot be said are often invisible to those within them. Nonetheless, a range of indicators reveals how the Overton Window has evolved, with the data pointing to a pronounced rightward shift in recent years, reflecting broader transformations across the political spectrum.

The section is divided into two parts. The first focuses on general political trends, highlighting the decline of the left, the rise of the centre and hard right, and the connection between socio-economic status and voting patterns. The second delves into the radicalisation of political rhetoric, particularly within Likud, and shifts in voter self-perception. It illustrates how the Israeli right has moved further to the extreme, while the left and its associated views have increasingly been relegated to the margins of public legitimacy.


Figure 3.1 - Political Representation in the Knesset, 2003–2022



Board of election

FE: The political Left in Israel is at its lowest point, while secular right-wing parties—such as Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu—have remained relatively stable. In contrast, the Religious Right and Haredi parties have reached their highest levels of influence.

Figure 3.2 - Trends in Percentage of Seats in the Kneset: Left-Centre and Religious Right, 2003–2022




Board of election

FE: For the first time, following the 2022 elections, the share of Knesset seats held by the Left fell below those held by the Religious Right.

T: The rise of the radical right in Israel has occurred alongside the growth of the political centre and the decline of the Left, highlighting the significant rightward shift in Israeli politics and public opinion since 2003.

Figure 3.3 - Voter Movement Between Parties in Israel, 2019–2021




Gidron & Sheffer & Mor, 2022

FE: The Likud remained stable across all four election cycles between 2019 and 2021, with only the ‘Yemina’ party (headed by former Prime Minister Bennett) successfully attracting voters from the ‘pro-Bibi’ camp to the ‘anti-Bibi’ camp.

T: Despite efforts by the Israeli Left and Centre over the past decade to align with the ‘Soft Right’ by adopting more right-wing policies, particularly on peace and security, this strategy has proven unsuccessful. The Centre has grown at the expense of the Left but has largely failed to attract voters from right-wing parties.

Figure 3.4 - Polling Average 2023-2025 (August)



Rozenr, 2025

FE: As a general election appears increasingly likely, this graph provides an overview of polling trends since October 7th. Overall, the opposition has maintained a majority throughout this period, with Netanyahu slowly regaining some strength over time. The only major shift occurred after Naftali Bennett announced his return to politics: many centrist voters—and some who had already moved to the opposition after October 7th—shifted their support from Gantz/Lapid to Bennett.


T1: The key shift in voter blocs occurred immediately after October 7th, when many moved from the right to the opposition. Unlike in previous election cycles, the mission of the liberal opposition this time is not to persuade soft right voters to cross over, but to maintain, identify, and mobilise those who already moved after the catastrophe.

T2: Naftali Bennett is uniquely positioned to retain these new voters as a right-leaning liberal alternative. His main strategy should be to run independently, focusing on consolidating this bloc. While alliances with other liberal parties may

expand his party at the expense of the centre-left, they are unlikely to attract additional voters from the right beyond those who have already shifted.

T3: That Bennett is now regarded by some as a leading candidate for the centre-left—despite his longstanding right-wing record and unchanged positions on security and peace after October 7th—illustrates how the political spectrum continues to shift rightward, with the centre-left following its lead.

Figure 3.5 - Socioeconomic Status of Left-Wing Voters in Israel, 1969–2019




Berman, 2020

FE: The Left parties in Israel have seen a shift in the socio-economic status of their voters. The top 5 socio-economic percentiles are more likely to vote for the Left than the bottom 5. This trend has grown since the 1977 elections, with some decrease by the 2019 elections.


T: While there may be opportunities for left-wing parties to expand their base among lower socio-economic groups, further research is needed to pinpoint which segments hold real potential for the Left. Calls to ‘go to the periphery’—staunch Likud strongholds like Ofakim or Dimona—are common. However, the data below (figures 3.6-3.9) suggests that central cities such as Petah Tikva, Kfar Saba, and Rishon Lezion, along with larger southern cities, offer significant opportunities as they are less dominated by Likud than traditional strongholds.

Figure 3.6 - Voting Distribution in Israel’s Central District Wealthy Cities
(% of All Votes), 2021–2022




Rahat, 2022

Figure 3.7 - Voting Distribution in Israel’s Development Towns
(% of All Votes), 2021–2022




Rahat, 2022

Figure 3.8 - Voting Distribution in Southern Cities of Israel (% of All Votes), 2021-2022




Rahat, 2022

Figure 3.9 - Voting Distribution in Israel's Central District Middle-Class Cities (% of All Votes), 2021-2022



Rahat, 2022

Figure 3.10 - Comparison of Right-Wing Populism: Likud and European Parties




Gidron, 2023

FE: The Likud has become a populist party, more extreme than some of the most far-right parties in Europe (such as AfD Fidesz and PiS). This is a unique development, as most far-right populist parties typically (1) emerge at the fringes of political systems, outside government, and (2) cooperate with centre-right parties while remaining more extreme than them. The Likud, however, has transformed from a centre-right to a radical right party while remaining in government.

T: This underscores the extent of radicalisation within the Israeli centre-right, which has shifted the Overton Window significantly to the right. This shift might explain how Israeli politics evolved from banning the Kahanist extremist party in the 1980s to accepting its political successor into the government in 2023.

Figure 3.11- Voter Self-Identified Political Position in Israel, 2003–2022




INES

FE: More Israelis self-identify as ideologically right than left. In most elections, when the political centre gains affiliation, it does so at the expense of the left. Interestingly, when identification with the left grows, the centre tends to benefit as well.

T: This trend highlights the delegitimization of the left, reflecting a rightward shift in the Overton Window. Views traditionally associated with the left in Israel—such as peace advocacy and opposition to the occupation—are increasingly seen as outside the mainstream and illegitimate by many.

Figure 3.12- Median Political Self-Identity Leaning Score, 2002–2022




INES

FE: In 2006 and 2019, the Israeli public positioned itself significantly more to the left, contrasting with a notable shift toward the right in the 2021 and 2022 election polling.

T: The centre thrives when the left is seen as more legitimate.


Figure 3.14 - Perception of Support for the Two-State Solution: All Israelis vs. Family and Friends, 2022



Molad, 2022

T: While a majority of Israelis support the two-state solution, most believe this view is held by only a small minority nationally. This disconnect, likely driven by a biased media discourse and the lack of effective political representation advocating for a two-state solution, is self-reinforcing, fostering a sense of marginalisation among peace supporters and cementing an Overton Window that excludes pro-peace views.

Figure 3.14- Political Positions of Jewish Youth in Israel, 2016–2022




Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2023

FE: The majority of Jewish youth in Israel now identify as right- or far-right-affiliated, reflecting a significant upward trend in recent years.

Section 4: Partnership

The relationship between World Jewry and Israel is ever-changing. Long-standing generational divides persist, with younger people feeling less connected to Israel than their elders, while new challenges continue to emerge. The aftermath of October 7th and the war have fuelled rising antisemitism, alongside widespread rejection of Netanyahu’s government by many Jews outside Israel. This section presents data on this complex relationship, covering public opinion in Jewish communities worldwide, experiences of antisemitism, and patterns of charitable giving, providing a portrayal of the evolving ties between Israel and world Jewry.


Figure 4.1 - Israeli’s Attachment to World Jewry, 2023



CBS Social Survey, 2023

FE: Seventy percent of the Israeli Jewish population feels a connection to the Jewish world outside of Israel.


Figure 4.2 - Attachment Levels of British Jews to Israel, 2022–2024



Boyd, 2024

FE: Seventy-eight percent of UK Jews and 90% of US Jews feel somewhat or strongly attached to Israel.


Figure 4.3 - Attachment Levels of U.S. Jews to Israel by Age, 2020



Pew, 2020

FE: This figure, based on 2020 data, shows weaker attachment to Israel among Jews aged 18–29. While “attachment” is not identical to “favourability,” more recent evidence (Figure 4.10, 2024) suggests that a majority of U.S. Jews continue to hold positive views of the Israeli people, even as views of the Israeli government are more divided.


Figure 4.4 - Worldwide Jewish Students’ Perspectives on Israel, 2024



Mosaic, 2024

FE: According to a Mosaic United poll conducted in November 2024, 94% of Jewish students report feeling emotionally attached to Israel. Research consistently shows that those who have visited Israel express stronger connections to both Israeli Jews and the State of Israel. It should be noted, however, that there may be a self-selection effect: students who choose to visit Israel are often already positively inclined.

Figure 4.5 - Experiences of Antisemitism in the Last 12 Months Among World Jewry, 2024




FRA, 2024

FE: As this graph and those that follow show, the October 7th massacre and the ensuing war led to a sharp rise in reported antisemitic incidents worldwide. A survey by the EU Antisemitism Task Force found that 96% of respondents across 13 EU countries had personally encountered an act of antisemitism.


T: The surge in antisemitism is likely to reshape the relationship between world Jewry and Israel, placing Israel more prominently in Jewish life worldwide. This shift could drive increased immigration to Israel and greater recognition of its centrality, but it may also deepen feelings of alienation. The direction is not predetermined—it will be shaped by political struggle and will. This moment presents an opportunity to mobilise liberal Jewish communities globally, as their commitment to liberal democracy, societal fairness, and secure peace aligns with Israel’s most urgent needs.

Figure 4.6 - Reported Antisemitic Incidents in the U.K., U.S., and France, 2012–2023



FE: Antisemitic incidents in the US, UK, and France have more than doubled since 2022, following years of stagnation or very gradual increases.


Figure 4.7 - Impact of October 7th and the Gaza War on British Jews’ Friendships with Jews and Non-Jews, 2024



Boyd, 2024

FE: The effects of the October 7th war extend beyond the rise in antisemitic incidents, shaping both relationships within the Jewish community and between Jews and non-Jews. In the UK, many Jews report feeling closer to their Jewish friends while becoming more distant from non-Jews in their daily lives.


Figure 4.8 - Global Jewry’s Perception of Being Blamed for Israeli Government Actions, 2024



FRA, 2024

FE: 39% of European Jews report being constantly accused of actions taken by the Israeli government, while only 25% say they are never accused.

Figure 4.9 - U.K. Jewish Community’s Approval Ratings of Netanyahu, 2024




Boyd, 2024

FE: Most Jews in the US and UK maintain a strong attachment to Israel but do not support its government. As of February 2024, 89% of American Jews expressed

support for the Israeli people, but only 54% supported the Israeli government. In the UK, 80% disapproved of Netanyahu’s leadership. A similar trend is reflected in French public opinion towards Israel, its citizens, and their government.

- T1:** This sentiment provides an opportunity to break the association between being “pro-Israel” and supporting Netanyahu’s government.
- T2:** It also presents a significant chance to mobilise these communities in support of strengthening the liberal camp in Israel.


Figure 4.10 - U.S. Jewry’s Opinions on the Israeli People and Government, 2024



Pew, 2024

FE: While approximately only half of Jewish Americans support the Israeli government, over 80% across all age groups have a favourable opinion of the Israeli people.


Figure 4.11 - French Public Opinion on Israel (% of Positive Views), 2017-2024



Ipsos, 2024


FE: Similar to the data from the United States, fewer than half of French Jews express support for the Israeli government. Yet across all age groups, more than 80% hold a favourable opinion of the Israeli people.

Figure 4.12 - Unfavourable Attitude Towards Israel – 24 Countries, 2025



Pew, 2025

Figure 4.13 – Sympathy for Israeli vs. Palestinian Sides in Western Europe, 2023–2025




YouGov, 2025

FE: Israel is facing an unprecedented international image crisis, particularly among its Western allies, where unfavourability rates now exceed 60%.

T: After October 7th, global opinion was initially sympathetic to Israel, with support far outweighing fringe identification with Hamas or anti-Israel protests. As the war has continued, however, favourability has declined across the political spectrum in many Western societies, including among centrists and right-leaning groups. Israelis often underestimate this shift, attributing it to the notion that “the world is always against us,” yet recognising these changing perceptions is essential to understanding the scale of the current crisis.


Figure 4.14 - Most of the US Citizens have Unfavourable Opinion Towards Israel, 2025



Ipsos, 2024

FE: Unfavourability towards Israel is rising sharply in the United States, across both the left and the right of the political spectrum.

Figure 4.15 - UK Jews Charity Patterns, 2022-2024



Boyd, 2024

FE: Donations from British Jews to Israeli charities have doubled from 2022 to 2024, likely driven by the events of October 7th.

T: This surge in donations offers a unique opportunity to direct support beyond the IDF and neutral causes like art and medicine, towards political organisations committed to safeguarding Israel’s identity as a Jewish and democratic state while advancing the cause of peace.



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